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Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program 
has been inconclusive.  Here we use a nested-dynamic programming framework to 
estimate an intra-seasonal dynamic model that explicitly incorporates a farmer’s crop 
abandonment decision.  The estimation is implemented for selected Texas counties 
where actuarial performances of the crop insurance program are poor and high incidences 
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Introduction 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are usually suggested as causes for the poor 
actuarial performance of the U.S. crop insurance program (Miranda; Goodwin; Horowitz 
and Lichtenberg; Smith and Goodwin; Coble, et al.; Wu; Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal).   
Although it has been shown in the empirical literature that inaccurate ex-ante premium 
rates lead to adverse selection (Miranda, Goodwin), empirical support for the existence of 
moral hazard has been difficult to find due to the lack of appropriate individual farm 
policy data. 
  Numerous empirical studies have evaluated how crop insurance affects producer’s 
production decision, such as chemical use (Horowitz and Lichtenberg; Smith and 
Goodwin), cultivation practices (Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal) and cropping patterns 
(Wu), but have provided only contradictory or inconclusive evidence of moral hazard.  
For example, Horowitz and Lichtenberg suggest that crop insurance has encouraged the 
chemical input usage for corn producers in the U.S. Midwest.  However, Smith and 
Goodwin argue that the insured Kansas dryland wheat producers tend to use less 
chemical input than the non-insured.  Another study of the effect of crop insurance on 
crop patterns and chemical use in Central Nebraska Basins is conducted by Wu.  The 
research applies the survey data from individual corn producers and finds that crop 
insurance participation encourages producers to switch the crops in higher economic 
values.    Goodwin, et al. study the acreage effects of crop insurance using the samples of 
corn and soybeans production in the U.S. Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in 
Northern Great Plains.    The relatively modest acreage responses in the increases in crop 
insurance participation are suggested.   4
  Several possibilities may explain the contradictory or inconclusive results.  First, 
each crop producer’s objective is to maximize expected profit, subject to the constraints 
imposed by market conditions, production environment and producer’s characteristics 
(Goodwin).  Thus the production decision will be complex and conditioned on all 
economic constraints.  The possibility that the impacts of one factor, such as crop 
insurance, on production practice decision might be offset by other factors, such as 
weather, cannot be excluded.  According to the Risk Management Agency (RMA) 
insurance protocols, crop insurance must be purchased prior to the start of the planting 
season.  The decision on chemical use may be more likely to be driven by weather 
condition rather than crop insurance purchasing decision.    As Horowitz and Lichtenberg 
state,  
“in regions and / or crops where high pest infestations occur 
primarily when crop growth conditions are good, pesticides 
work by increasing output in good states of nature and are thus 
likely to be risk-increasing.” 
The contradictory results of crop insurance decision on chemical use in agriculture can be 
expected.  Second, production practices vary among individual farmers.  In order to 
better understand producers’ incentives to commit fraud and to effectively detect it, 
reliable individual farm data is required.  Most studies employ county level data rather 
than individual farm data to analyze the individual farmer’s behavior.  The use of 
aggregate yield data may create the problems for underestimating moral hazard because 
aggregate yield are less variable than individual yields (Goodwin).  Third, the counties 
or region chosen in these studies may not exhibit the extreme conditions necessary to   5
induce widespread moral hazard.    For example, the loss ratios
1  for Iowa corn exceeded 
on only once between 1989-2003.  During the same fifteen-year period, however, the 
loss for Texas upland cotton in Texas exceeded one in all but four years (see Table 1).  
This suggests that the crop insurance program is more likely to have severe rating or 
monitoring problems in Texas than in Iowa. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Loss Ratios for Corn in Iowa and 
Upland Cotton in Texas: 1989-2003 
 
 Loss  Ratios 
Year  Iowa Corn
1  Texas Upland Cotton 
1989 0.82  2.76 
1990 0.30  1.22 
1991 0.72  2.09 
1992 0.17  3.81 
1993 4.96  0.86 
1994 0.05  0.64 
1995 0.98  1.27 
1996 0.24  1.60 
1997 0.09  0.54 
1998 0.58  1.93 
1999 0.32  1.15 
2000 0.35  1.62 
2001 0.67  1.62 
2002 0.20  0.91 
2003 0.18  1.55 
1989-2003 average  0.71  1.57 
1 The report of loss ratios for corn in Iowa includes corn for grain only.   
 
 
Insured producers receive the indemnities if and only if the actual crop yield or 
revenue is less than the selected coverage level of the proving yield or revenue, 
                                                 
1 The loss ratio, defined as the ratio of total indemnity paid by an insurance policy to the total premium 
received, is a standard measure of the actuarial performance of insurance program.    For example, the loss 
ratio in 1990 for corn in Iowa indicates that on average, the insurance policies paid out approximately $0.30 
of indemnity for every dollar of total premium received, including farmer paid premium plus government 
premium subsidies.   6
depending upon the type of insurance policy purchased.  Therefore, if the expected 
profit of bring the crop to harvest is likely to be less than the net insurance profit, which 
equals indemnity received minus producer premium paid, the insured producers have 
incentive to abandon the acreage to increase the likelihood of collecting the indemnity.  
The differences in acreage between the planting season and harvest season can provide 
the information about how much acreage is abandoned.  The existence of moral hazard 
can be further demonstrated by comparing the insured and the non-insured producers’ 
acreage abandonment behaviors.     
The objective of this paper is to examine whether the insurance participation 
decision encourages producers to abandon their crops.  We begin by constructing an 
intra-seasonal dynamic optimization model that explicitly incorporates crop producer’s 
acreage abandonment decision with and without purchasing crop insurance.  Certain 
upland cotton producing counties in Texas are chosen for the empirical application based 
on their poor actuarial performance of the crop insurance program.  For these counties, 
loss ratios have frequently been above one and there is a high incidence of acreage 
abandonment.  Figure 1 illustrates the 1989-2003 upland cotton acreage abandonment 
ratios for these Texas
2 counties.  The acreage abandonment ratio ranges from zero to 
more than eighty percent across counties and years.   An interesting phenomenon is that 
not all of the counties have the same acreage abandonment ratio during the same period 
of time.  It is possible that cotton producer’s decision on acreage abandoned is made 
subject to not only the environmental condition but economic concerns. 
                                                 
2  The absence information may be resulted from: 
a) there is no changes between planted acreage and harvested acreage, which means zero acreage 
abandonment ratio; 
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Figure 1: County-level Acreage Abandonment Ratios for Upland Cotton in Selected 




  The major obstacle of evaluating crop producer’s fraud behavior is the availability 
and reliability of individual farm level data (Rejesus, et al).  Numerous types of 
agricultural data are recorded by various government agencies under the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA).  They are often tabulated in a different basis.    In this analysis, 
the data for individual insured units are obtained from unpublished Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) Corporate Database, which contains all detailed insurance contract data 
submitted by insurance providers.  Various records are collected, including type 10 
record – policy holder, type 15 record – yield, type 11 record – acreage, and type 21 
record – loss claim.  The detailed information for each insured units contains reported 
acreage at planting season, coverage level, base premium rate, total premium, producer 
premium, liability, indemnity, production, determined acreage at harvest season and 
10-year APH yield  There is no direct report for the non-insured in agricultural data so   8
the agricultural county-level data downloaded from USDA’s National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) database, such as planted acreage, harvested acreage, yield and 
production, is applied in this research.  However, the NASS county-level data, which is 
collected through sample surveys, tabulates acreages based on reports from operators 
while RMA insurance data tabulates acreages from owners and operators.  The 
magnitudes of sampling and nonsampling errors
3  in NASS county data are unknown.    If 
in a given county, the sizes of farm for most farm enterprises are small, the magnitudes of 
sampling and nonsampling errors are more likely to be severe.    The selected counties in 
this study encounter the problem that the NASS county-level planted acreage less than 
the reported acreage at the planting season for the insured in RMA insurance data are 
frequently observed.  This may potentially suggest the magnitudes of sampling and 
nonsampling errors are grave in NASS county data.     
  Regardless of the potential problem in NASS county data, the RMA insurance data 
and NASS county data both provide consistent information.  Figure 2-4 illustrated 
1989-2003 acreage abandonment ratios in selected Texas counties.  Note that the 
county-level acreage abandonment ratio is the weighted average of the acreage 
abandonment ratio for the insured and for the non-insured.    Figure 2 and Figure 3 imply 
that the acreage abandonment ratios for the non-insured in Brooks County and in Duval 
County would be much lower than the ratios for the insured.    The differences in acreage 
abandonment ratio between the insured and the non-insured suggest the potential 
existence of moral hazard.    In contrast, the acreage abandonment ratio for the insured is 
not consistently higher than the acreage abandonment ratio for the all farmers in Jim 
Wells County.  The potential existence of moral hazard effect is ambiguous though the 
                                                 
3  See Lohr for more detailed discussion.   9
acreage abandonment ratios for the insured producers are higher than the ratios for all 
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Figure 2: Comparison of Acreage Abandonment Ratio between Insured and All 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Acreage Abandonment Ratio between Insured and All 
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Figure 4: Comparison of Acreage Abandonment Ratio for Insured and All Farmers 
in Jim Wells County, Texas: 1989-2003 
 
 
Dynamic Optimization Models 
The paper is primarily interested in constructing an intra-seasonal dynamic 
optimization model that explicitly incorporates crop producer’s acreage abandonment 
decision with and without purchasing crop insurance.  Each producer’s objective is to 
maximize expected profits.  Before the planting season, each farmer decides whether to 
participate in the insurance policy, which crop to be insured and what coverage level to 
purchase.    Later in the growing season, but before the harvest, the farmer observes crop 
conditions and the status of the economic market and makes the optimal decision to 
curtail or continue to make efforts to bring his crop to harvest.  In other words, if the 
state variables, market price and crop condition, which are mainly subject to weather 
random shock, suggest that if the net insured profit is more likely to be higher than the 
crop sale profit, crop insurance may encourage the insured farmer to abandon more crops 
to maximize his expected profits while the non-insured producer may take the risks to 
continue his efforts.       11
Using individual farm policy data provided by the Risk Management Agency 
(RMA), we estimate the parameters of the structural model using a nested dynamic 
programming procedure in which the structural model is resolved numerically with each 
perturbation of the maximum-likelihood (or least-square) criterion function.  Before 
proceeding to the intra-seasonal dynamic optimization analysis, a simple probit model is 
utilized to examine the sensitivity analysis of moral hazard effect.  A system of linear 
equations for three selected counties over the years 1989-2003 is estimated for all farmers 
and the insured farmers.    The model is given by 
(1)   i i i e X y + + = β α    
where  i y   is the acreage abandonment ratio for countyi,  α andβ   are parameters of the 
equation and  i e is the error term.  The independent variable includes net insured profit, 
which is considered as the expected net return to insurance for the insured producers.  
Table 2 and Table 3 provide the definition and statistics summary of all relevant variables 
for each selected Texas counties. 
 









Total number of acres planted. 
achar  Total number of acres harvested. 
abn_ratio  = (acplt – achar) / acplt. 
acplt_ins  The number of acres/tons reported by the insured before adjustment for share. 
achar_ins  Acres on which has positive production as determined by the adjuster at the 
time of loss. 
insabn_ratio  = (acplt_ins – achar_ins) / acplt_ins. 
net  insured  profit  Total dollar amount of the loss received, including indemnity and subsidy, 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables Relevant to the Sensitivity Analysis: Three 
Selected Texas Counties, 1989-2003 
      
      
 Brooks  County Duval  County Jim  Wells  County 
        






    
acplt 2054.55  792.92 3072.73 2699.29 13546.67  5972.66
achar 1281.82  567.13 1636.36 928.73 11293.33  6420.11
abn_ratio 0.33  0.27 0.36 0.23 0.18  0.22
acplt_ins 1610.79  1184.02 2428.40 2703.12 15212.67  6803.82
achar_ins 1610.79  1184.02 2076.13 2780.01 7098.53  6494.10
insabn_ratio 0.95  0.11 0.62 0.36 0.26  0.21
net insured profit  211923.21  189261.37 185018.47 342261.96 530061.47  764200.22




  The parameter estimates for the probit model, shown in Table 4, reflects that as net 
insured profit increases, the acreage abandonment ratio for all farmers in Duval county 
increases significantly as well as for the insured producers in Jim Wells county.  In 
addition, the significant positive coefficients on the intercept terms in the equation II for 
the three counties indicated that there may be other potential factors which play important 
roles on the insured producer’s acreage abandonment decision. 
 
Future Study 
  In an attempt to address the problem of moral hazard, certain cotton producing 
counties in Texas are chosen for the empirical application due to the poor actuarial 
performance of the crop insurance in these counties and the high incidence of acreage 
abandonment ratio.    The RMA individual insured farm policy data and the NASS county 
level data illustrate the potential existence of fraud behaviors in acreage abandonment   13
between the insured and the non-insured cotton producers.   The next step of this 
research is to construct an intra-seasonal dynamic optimization model that incorporates 
crop producer’s acreage abandonment decision with and without purchasing crop 
insurance.  In addition, more data at county level or at state level will be obtained to 




Table 4: Estimated Parameter Results: Three Selected Texas Counties, 1989-2003 
      
      
 Brooks  County Duval  County Jim  Wells  County 













    
Equation I: acreage abandonment ratio for all farmers 
intercept  0.182   0.154 0.274* 0.068 0.129   0.067
net  insured  profit  0.000   0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000   0.000
    
Equation II: acreage abandonment ratio for the insured 
intercept 0.897*  0.044 0.562* 0.104 0.157*  0.051
net insured profit  0.000    0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000*  0.000
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